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I.    INTRODUCTION 
The Sixth Amendment safeguards an accused in criminal proceedings and 
affords them “the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury[.]”1  
In furtherance of this right, the no-impeachment rule prohibits a juror from 
testifying after a verdict has been handed down about the jurors’ 
deliberations.2  While there are limited exceptions to the no-impeachment 
rule, juror expressed racial bias is not one of them.3  When presented with 
the dilemma of a juror using racial bias in deliberations, courts must weigh 
two competing doctrines that serve as the foundation to our judicial system: 
(1) affording a defendant his or her constitutional rights to an impartial jury 
in criminal proceedings, and (2) ensuring that we protect the secrecy of the 
jury’s deliberations.4 
 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 860 (2017) 
(“The right to a jury trial in criminal cases was part of the Constitution as first drawn, and it was restated 
in the Sixth Amendment.” (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 3; id. amend. VI)).  Through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the right to a jury trial in a criminal case applies to the states.  Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1968); see also Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 624 (1976) 
(acknowledging that the Fourteenth Amendment affords an individual involved in a criminal case the 
right to jury trial, and when tried in a federal tribunal, this right falls within the guarantees of the Sixth 
Amendment).  “The Court in In re Oliver made it clear that [the right to a speedy and public trial] extends 
to the [s]tates.”  Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 212 (2010) (citation omitted) (citing In re Oliver, 
333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)).  Further, the Sixth Amendment right is explicitly the accused’s right.  Id. 
2. FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1).  The no-impeachment rule rests on additional grounds, which 
include the need for finality, privacy for the deliberations, and juror protection from harassment and 
tampering.  DAVID A. SCHLUETER & JONATHAN D. SCHLUETER, TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE 
MANUAL 541 (10th ed. 2015). 
3.  FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2); Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 767 (9th Cir. 2007) (defining bias 
as “bias in fact[,]” meaning that a “person will not act with entire impartiality” (quoting United States 
v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000))); United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1112 
(9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that actual bias is found when a potential juror admits an inability to be 
impartial). 
4. Lisa Soronen, State ‘No-Impeachment’ Rules May Require a Rewrite, NCLS BLOG (Apr. 18, 2017), 
http://www.ncsl.org/blog/2016/04/18/state-no-impeachment-rules-may-require-a-rewrite.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/Q75N-2CJS]; see also Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 
381 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to speak 
openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply the Constitution with eyes open to the 
unfortunate effects of centuries of racial discrimination.”).  Secrecy, however, is only one of the policy 
reasons for the no-impeachment rule.  SCHLUETER & SCHLUETER, supra note 2, at 541. 
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In 2017, in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado,5 the United States Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of whether the no-impeachment rule overrules the Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury in a criminal case.6  In a 5–3 decision, 
the Supreme Court held that the no-impeachment rule must give way, and 
courts are permitted to inquire into jury deliberations to determine whether 
a juror expressed racial bias during those deliberations.7  In doing so, the 
Supreme Court carved out a new exception to the long-standing rule that 
jury deliberations are to remain private.  The majority opinion, written by 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, created a racial-bias exception to the no-
impeachment rule.8  Justice Kennedy asserted that “blatant racial prejudice 
is antithetical to the functioning of the jury system and must be confronted 
in egregious cases[.]”9 
With this introduction, Part II of this Recent Development will discuss 
the history of the no-impeachment rule and the challenge of grappling with 
the plain language of the rule in light of an individual’s Sixth Amendment 
right to a fair and impartial jury trial.  Part III will evaluate the background 
to the Peña-Rodriguez case and the path it took from the trial court up to the 
United States Supreme Court.  Part IV will evaluate the majority opinion 
and the dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court’s decision in Peña-
Rodriguez.  Part V will address whether the Peña-Rodriguez holding will apply 
in civil cases as well. 
II.    THE LAW BEFORE PEÑA-RODRIGUEZ V. COLORADO 
A. Common Law 
At common law, jurors were prohibited from impeaching a verdict by live 
testimony or affidavit.10  This rule became known as the no-impeachment 
rule.  Later, courts adopted a more flexible version of this rule, which 
 
5. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017). 
6. Id. at 861. 
7. Id. at 869 (creating the racial-bias exception to the no-impeachment rule, which requires the 
no-impeachment rule to give way for the trial court to hear evidence on whether a juror used racial 
bias in reaching a verdict). 
8. Id. at 871. 
9. Id.; see also Gaines v. United States, 994 A.2d 391, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding a witness’s 
racial bias in the courtroom is within the scope of cross-examination when impeaching the witness’s 
credibility). 
10. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863. 
3
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became known as the “Iowa rule.”11  The Iowa rule prohibited a juror from 
testifying about their subjective beliefs regarding a case.12  Early court 
decisions did not show an allegiance to a particular version of the no-
impeachment rule.13  Subsequently, an exception to the no-impeachment 
rule surfaced—termed the “federal approach”—which allowed jurors to 
testify regarding extraneous events that occurred outside of deliberations.14 
In United States v. Reid,15 the Court left the door open to the possibility of 
creating an exception to the no-impeachment rule.16  Even still, the Court 
in Reid rejected impeachable evidence because it did not have the slightest 
influence on the outcome of the case.17  Similarly, the Court in McDonald v. 
Pless18 dismissed the opportunity to create an exception to the no-
impeachment rule by holding that only in the “gravest and most important 
cases” will the Supreme Court create an exception to the common law no-
impeachment rule.19  In 1975, Congress cleared the air by enacting Federal 
Rule of Evidence 606(b), which provided explicit exceptions to the no-
impeachment rule.20 
 
11. Id. at 876 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Under the Iowa rule, jurors were generally permitted to 
testify about any subject except their ‘subjective intentions and thought processes in reaching a 
verdict.’” (citing Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 526 (2014))). 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 863 (majority opinion); see also Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892), 
(holding the denial of juror affidavits was reversible error), superseded by statute, Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. 
L. No. 93–595, 88 Stat. 1926, as recognized in Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855; United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 
361, 366–67 (1851) (denying a motion for a new trial based on jurors reading a prejudicial news article 
during the trial), superseded by statute, Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93–595, 88 Stat. 1926, as recognized 
in Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855. 
14. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863. 
15. United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361 (1851), superseded by statute, Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. 
No. 93–595, 88 Stat. 1926, as recognized in Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855. 
16. Compare id. at 366 (recognizing there may be cases where it would be prejudicial to reject 
certain impeachable evidence), with Mattox, 146 U.S. at 151 (requiring the jurors to sign affidavits 
admitting they consulted outside information during deliberations). 
17. Reid, 53 U.S. at 366 (acknowledging that two jurors saw newspapers containing evidence 
from the trial but barring this admission into evidence after both jurors swore the “papers had not the 
slightest influence on their verdict”). 
18. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915). 
19. Id. at 269. 
20. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 864.  At the time the United States Supreme Court decided Peña-
Rodriguez, Federal Rule 606(b) read as follows: 
(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence.  During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or 
indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred 
during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; 
or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment.  The court may not 
receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on these matters. 
4
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B. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)—The No-Impeachment Rule 
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) generally prohibits jurors from 
discussing the events or statements that took place during deliberations.21  
However, the Rule contains three exceptions, allowing a juror to testify 
about: (1) “extraneous prejudicial information [being] improperly brought 
to the jury’s attention;”22 (2) “an outside influence [being] improperly 
brought to bear on any juror;”23 or (3) “a mistake [being] made in entering 
the verdict on the verdict form.”24  The first two exceptions pertain to juror 
bias or prejudice.25  The adoption of Rule 606(b) provided assurances to 
jurors that, even after being discharged from their duties, they would not be 
summoned back to testify about what was said during jury deliberations26—
which ultimately led to finality of their verdicts.27 
 
(2) Exceptions.  A juror may testify about whether: 
  (A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention; 
  (B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror; or 
  (C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form. 
Id. at 864–65.  As it stands, forty-two jurisdictions have adopted Federal Rule 606(b), while nine 
jurisdictions currently follow the Iowa rule.  Id. at 865.  Of those forty-two jurisdictions, Pennsylvania 
and Colorado are the only states to have been presented with the issue of racial bias as it pertains to 
Rule 606(b)—both have declined to establish a racial-bias exception.  Id.; Commonwealth v. Steele, 
961 A.2d 786, 807–08 (Pa. 2008). 
21. Amanda R. Wolin, Comment, What Happens in the Jury Room Stays in the Jury Room . . . but 
Should It?: A Conflict Between the Sixth Amendment and Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), 60 UCLA L. REV. 
262, 265 (2012); see also Susan Crump, Jury Misconduct, Jury Interviews, and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Is the 
Broad Exclusionary Principle of Rule 606(b) Justified?, 66 N.C. L. REV. 509, 511 (1988) (claiming the no-
impeachment rule was enacted on public policy reasons grounded in protecting the jury system). 
22. FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2)(A). 
23. Id. R. 606(b)(2)(B). 
24. Id. R. 606(b)(2)(C). 
25. Wolin, supra note 21, at 265; see also Colin Miller, Dismissed with Prejudice: Why Application of the 
Anti-Jury Impeachment Rule to Allegations of Racial, Religious, or Other Bias Violates the Right to Present a Defense, 
61 BAYLOR L. REV. 872, 875–76 (2009) (explaining Rule 606(b) prohibits a juror from providing 
testimony, after a verdict has been handed down, regarding ethnic slurs made during trial). 
26. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 861 (2017); see also Crump, supra note 21, at 511 
(explaining there are rules that place restrictions on a lawyer’s ability to contact the jurors after trial). 
27. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 865.  The no-impeachment rule is considered the general rule 
with regard to finality of convictions.  The rule ensures that, upon entering a verdict, the verdict will 
not be questioned based on conclusions or comments made during deliberations.  See Fullwood v. Lee, 
290 F.3d 663, 680 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[A] party seeking to invalidate a verdict may not rely upon evidence 
of ‘a juror’s mental process in connection with the verdict.’” (first quoting United States v. Cheek, 
94 F.3d 136, 143 (4th Cir. 1996); then citing FED. R. EVID. 606(b); Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 
107 (1987))); see also Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 865 (finding Rule 606(b) provides for finality of 
verdicts). 
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In two hallmark cases, Tanner v. United States28 and Warger v. Shauers,29 the 
United States Supreme Court rejected exceptions to Rule 606(b).30  The 
Supreme Court used those two cases as support—in Peña-Rodriguez v. 
Colorado—for its proposition that “[p]rotecting the secrecy of the jury 
deliberations is of paramount importance in our justice system.”31  In both 
Tanner and Warger, the Supreme Court stood by Rule 606(b) and rejected the 
opportunities to create an exception to the no-impeachment rule.32  While 
the facts of Tanner and Warger are not identical to those found in Peña-
Rodriguez, the Colorado Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court refused 
to create a “dividing line between different types of juror bias or 
misconduct[.]”33 
C. Tanner v. United States 
In Tanner v. United States, petitioners were indicted and convicted of 
committing mail fraud and conspiring to defraud the United States pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 371.34  Prior to being sentenced, Tanner’s defense attorney 
received information that some of the jurors were consuming alcohol and 
illegal drugs during their lunch break throughout the trial.35  As a result of 
consuming these substances, some of the jurors would sleep upon returning 
to court in the afternoon.36 
 
28. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987). 
29. Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521 (2014). 
30. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 126–27 (regarding the use of drugs and alcohol by jurors during the trial 
as not falling within the Rule 606(b) exceptions); Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 524, 529 (deciding the affidavit 
intended to impeach the verdict, which detailed a juror’s empathy for the defendant and hesitation to 
award pain and suffering damages based on a personal experience of the juror, was not extraneous 
prejudicial information but rather “internal” information).  Extraneous information comes from a 
source outside of the jury.  Tanner, 483 U.S. at 117.  In Warger, the affidavit derived from “internal 
matters,” thus excluding the option of using the extraneous prejudicial information exception to the 
no-impeachment rule.  Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 529; FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2)(A). 
31. Soronen, supra note 4. 
32. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 878 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
33. Peña-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 293 (Colo. 2015), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).  In 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s dissenting opinion, Justice Alito agreed with the Colorado Supreme Court’s 
reluctance to create a dividing line between juror bias.  Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 882 (Alito, J., 
dissenting); see also Soronen, supra note 4 (summarizing the Colorado Supreme Court’s inability to 
decipher between various types of partiality to find a racial-bias exception to the no-impeachment rule). 
34. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 109. 
35. See id. at 113 (“Tanner’s attorney had received an unsolicited telephone call from one of the 
trial jurors . . .  inform[ing him] that several of the jurors consumed alcohol during the lunch 
breaks[,] . . . causing them to sleep through the afternoons.”).  One juror noted that several jurors used 
marijuana and cocaine on multiple occasions during the trial.  Id. at 115–16. 
36. Id. at 113. 
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After learning this information, petitioners filed a motion for a new trial 
and for permission to interview the jurors.37  The district court denied their 
requests, citing Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b),38 which prohibits the use 
of a juror’s testimony to impeach a jury verdict except with regard to outside 
influences.39  On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the holding of the 
district court.40  Petitioners filed a writ of certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court.41 
The Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit in part and remanded the case 
for further proceedings.42  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for the 
majority, held that the district court did not err in denying petitioners’ 
request to allow evidence of alleged juror intoxication during the trial 
because not allowing the evidence was the most reasonable reading of 
Rule 606(b).43  Accordingly, a reasonable reading of Rule 606(b) would not 
permit a juror to testify about juror intoxication as an outside influence for 
which a juror is able to testify about to impeach a verdict.44  The Court 
further held there were no potential Sixth Amendment violations as a result 
of this holding because there were other safeguards in the trial process to 
protect the petitioners from an unfair or biased trial.45  Some of these 
 
37. See id. (explaining that the day before sentencing, petitioners requested a “continuance of 
the sentencing date, permission to interview jurors, an evidentiary hearing, and a new trial”). 
38. FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1) (prohibiting a court from receiving an affidavit from a juror 
regarding an incident or statement made during the jury’s deliberations). 
39. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 113 (holding testimony from the jury regarding intoxication was 
inadmissible); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 9–10 (1973) (“[A juror can] testify as to the influence 
of extraneous prejudicial information brought to the jury’s attention . . . or an outside influence [that] 
improperly had been brought to bear upon a juror . . . but [the juror cannot] testify as to other 
irregularities [that] occurred in the jury room.”).  The purpose of House Report 650 was to provide 
uniformity to the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Id. at 1.  Some rules were deleted by the Committee on 
Judiciary, while others were retained but amended.  Id. at 5–6.  The Committee retained Rule 606(b) 
but significantly amended it.  Id. at 9–10. 
40. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 110; United States v. Conover, 772 F.2d 765, 767 (11th Cir. 1985). 
41. Tanner v. United States, 479 U.S. 929 (1986). 
42. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 134. 
43. Id. at 127.  See H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 10 (1973) (prohibiting “a juror [from] testify[ing] 
to the drunken condition of a fellow juror which so disabled him that he could not participate in the 
jury’s deliberations”).  At the time of Tanner, the House and Senate had a difference of opinion on the 
reading of Rule 606(b).  Tanner, 483 U.S. at 125.  The Senate’s reading of the Rule prohibited a juror 
from testifying about any statement or matter that occurred during jury deliberations.  H.R. REP. 
NO. 93-1597, at 8 (1974) (Conf. Rep.).  Whereas the House’s reading of the Rule allowed a juror to 
testify regarding any objective matter that occurred during the jury’s deliberations.  Id.  See Tanner, 
483 U.S. at 125 (asserting a result of this legislative history of differing interpretations is “strong 
support for [allowing] the most reasonable reading of the language of Rule 606(b)”). 
44. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 125. 
45. Id. at 127. 
7
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safeguards46—later termed the “Tanner safeguards”47—are establishing the 
suitability of a juror during voir dire;48 the ability of court personnel, or 
other jurors, to report any juror misconduct;49 and a defendant’s ability to 
impeach a verdict through the use of non-juror evidence.50 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, concurring in part and dissenting in part in 
Tanner,51 stated that because the petitioners’ claims involved “objectively 
verifiable conduct [that] occur[ed] prior to [the jury’s] deliberations, juror 
testimony in support of the [petitioners’] claims is admissible under 
Rule 606(b).”52  Justice Marshall further contended that testimony 
regarding whether a juror was intoxicated falls within the “outside influence 
exception” of Rule 606(b) and to ignore this behavior is to denigrate the 
petitioners’ Sixth Amendment right to a trial by a competent jury.53  
Justice Marshall alluded to the fact that the safeguards mentioned in the 
majority opinion would do little to avoid a recurrence of this issue.54  He 
also indicated that voir dire is an ineffective measure to determine whether 
an individual will use drugs or alcohol and that court personnel are not 
present during the lunch break to witness whether the jurors are using drugs 
or alcohol.55  In closing, Justice Marshall stressed the importance of the 
 
46. See Ashok Chandran, Note, Color in the “Black Box”: Addressing Racism in Juror Deliberations, 
5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 28, 40 (2014) (identifying voir dire, court personnel observations, jurors’ ability 
to report fellow jurors for misconduct, and non-juror evidence as procedural safeguards for preventing 
bias during jury deliberations); see also Leah S. P. Rabin, Comment, The Public Injury of an Imperfect Trial: 
Fulfilling the Promise of Tanner and the Sixth Amendment Through Post-Verdict Inquiry into Truthfulness at Voir 
Dire, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 537, 540–41 (2011) (describing acts and comments during jury 
deliberations as unobservable by non-jurors because of the safeguards in place and their effectiveness). 
47.  Chandran, supra note 46, at 42. 
48. See Prescott Loveland, Acknowledging and Protecting Against Judicial Bias at Fact-Finding in Juvenile 
Court, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 283, 303 (2017) (explaining how jurors are susceptible to racially-based 
bias but safeguards are in place, such as “voir dire, to root out prospective jurors with discernible 
biases”); see also Christina Collins, Comment, Stuck in the 1960s: Supreme Court Misses an Opportunity in 
Skilling v. United States to Bring Venue Jurisprudence into the Twenty-First Century, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
391, 395 (2012) (“The process of voir dire is the primary means to discover prejudice or conflict of 
interest within the jury pool.”).  But see United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 202 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(explaining, with regard to bias, there are no guarantees the safeguards will be effective). 
49. Chandran, supra note 46, at 40. 
50. Id. 
51. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 134 (1987). 
52. Id. at 138 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
53. Id. at 134 (“If . . . members of petitioners’ jury were intoxicated as a result of their use of 
drugs and alcohol to the point of sleeping through material portions of the trial, the verdict in this case 
must be set aside.”). 
54. See id. at 141–42 (“Reliance on these safeguards, to the exclusion of an evidentiary hearing, 
is misguided.”). 
55. Id. at 142. 
8
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petitioners’ Sixth Amendment rights by declaring “if we deny [petitioners] 
this opportunity, the jury system may survive, but the constitutional 
guarantee on which it is based will become meaningless.”56 
D. Warger v. Shauers 
In Warger v. Shauers,57 petitioner Gregory Warger sued Randy Shauers for 
negligence due to injuries he sustained in a motor vehicle accident.58  
Ultimately, the jury found for Shauers.59  Following the verdict, a juror 
contacted Warger’s attorney and stated that the jury foreperson had a 
daughter who was responsible for causing a fatal motor vehicle accident and 
that a lawsuit would have devastated her daughter’s life.60  This information 
was in direct opposition to the information the foreperson had presented 
during voir dire and called into question the foreperson’s ability to hear the 
present case impartially.61  With a signed affidavit from the disclosing juror, 
Warger filed a motion for a new trial.62 
The district court denied petitioner’s motion because Federal Rule of 
Evidence 606(b) bars evidence of any statements made during jury 
deliberations.63  The Eight Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding,64 
and the petitioner sought review by the United States Supreme Court.  In 
2014, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, writing for a unanimous Court, held that 
“Rule 606(b) applies to juror testimony during a proceeding in which a party 
seeks to secure a new trial on the ground that a juror lied during voir dire.”65  
The Supreme Court also held that the juror affidavit did not fall within the 
Rule 606(b) exception for extraneous prejudicial information because the 
information within the affidavit was not received from an extraneous 
source—rather, the information stemmed from statements made during 
jury deliberations.66  Even though the Court in Warger refused to create 
 
56. Id. 
57. Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521 (2014). 





63. See id. at 525 (detailing the district court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion for new trial because 
“the only evidence that supported [the motion], the complaining juror’s affidavit, was barred by Federal 
Rule of Evidence 606(b)”); FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (applying when an individual attempts to make “an 
inquiry into the validity of a verdict”). 
64. Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 525; Warger v. Shauers, 721 F.3d 606, 613 (8th Cir. 2013). 
65. Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 525. 
66. See id. at 529 (arguing that the juror’s affidavit contained information that could be found 
internally in the deliberation process).  The Court noted that the information from the juror’s 
9
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another exception to Rule 606(b), the Court noted that an exception may be 
created for “juror bias so extreme that, almost by definition, the jury trial 
has been abridged.”67  The Court thus left the door open for the possibility 
of a new “bias” exception to the no-impeachment rule. 
E. Circuit Splits: Creating a Racial-Bias Exception v. The Tanner  
Safeguards 
Federal appellate courts have found, or suggested, that there is a 
permissible exception to the no-impeachment rule when there is evidence 
that racial bias was used by jurors during deliberations.68  For example, in 
United States v. Flemming,69 the Third Circuit held that it was permissible to 
investigate into a juror’s bias.70  The Flemming court further held that a 
defendant should be granted a new trial when the defendant is able to show 
that he or she “suffered ‘substantial prejudice’ as a result of the jury’s 
exposure to . . . extraneous information.”71 
In contrast to the Flemming holding, other federal appellate courts have 
not been open to a racial-bias exception and have held that the Tanner 
safeguards are sufficient and effective.  For example, the Seventh Circuit 
denied a defendant’s petition for habeas corpus in Shillcutt v. Gagnon72 after 
the court was notified that one of the jurors stated, “Let’s be logical.  He’s 
 
daughter’s accident may have provided insight on how that juror viewed motor vehicle accident 
liability, but it did not go so far as to provide the juror, or her fellow jurors, with enough specific 
information to influence Shauer’s case.  Id. at 529; see also Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117–
18 (1987) (defining extraneous information as information that is derived from a source external to the 
jury). 
67. Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 529 n.3. 
68. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 865 (2017); United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 
76, 87 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding the Tanner safeguards ineffective with regards to “racially and ethnically 
biased comments made during deliberations”); United States v. Lloyd, 269 F.3d 228, 237 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(“[A] criminal defendant is entitled to a determination of his or her guilt by an unbiased jury based 
solely upon evidence properly admitted against him or her in court.” (quoting Virgin Islands v. 
Dowling, 814 F.2d 134, 138 (3d Cir. 1987))); United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 
2001) (characterizing racial bias as being inapplicable to Rule 606(b) because the Supreme Court has 
held “a juror may testify concerning any mental bias in matters unrelated to the specific issues that the 
juror was called upon to decide” and that racial bias is plainly unrelated to a “specific issue that a juror 
in a criminal case may legitimately be called upon to determine” (citing Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 
121 n.5 (1983))). 
69. United States v. Flemming, 223 F. App’x 117 (3d Cir. 2007). 
70. The Third Circuit held that due to a defendant’s right to be tried by an unbiased jury, “a 
court may inquire into the verdict if extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the 
jury’s attention[.]”  Id. at 124 (citing United States v. Lloyd, 269 F.3d 228, 237 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
71. Id. (quoting Lloyd, 269 F.3d at 238). 
72. Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1987). 
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black and he sees a seventeen[-]year[-]old white girl—I know the type.”73  
The Seventh Circuit cited Tanner as support for its decision to uphold 
Rule 606(b).74  The Seventh Circuit further asserted that, although crude, 
the statements made by the juror were ideas exchanged during jury 
deliberations.75  However, in Shillcutt, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the 
importance of eliminating prejudicial communications in the jury room and 
the need to investigate into the racial bias to determine whether it had an 
effect on the outcome of the case.76  Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit 
maintained its position that the Tanner safeguards were sufficient and a 
racial-bias exception was not necessary.77 
The Tenth Circuit, in United State v. Benally,78 denied a defendant’s request 
to create a racial-bias exception, stating that the Tanner safeguards were 
sufficient and effective.79  In Benally, the court used a balancing test to 
determine whether a juror’s affidavit describing juror misconduct was 
admissible to impeach a verdict.80  The court concluded that the Tanner 
safeguards are effective in exposing racial bias.81  The court further stated 
that the Tanner safeguards, while effective, will not eliminate every biased 




73. Id. at 1156; see also Miller, supra note 25, at 878–79 (discussing the facts of Shillcutt). 
74. Shillcutt, 827 F.2d at 1159. 
75. Id. 
76. See id. (noting the court “consider[ed] whether prejudice pervaded the jury room,” meaning 
“whether there [was] a substantial probability that the alleged racial slur made a difference in the 
outcome of the trial” but nonetheless denied the defendant’s petition for habeas corpus). 
77. See id. (concluding the racial slur likely had no impact on the outcome of the trial and 
applying the no-impeachment rule). 
78. United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2008), overruled in part by Peña-Rodriguez 
v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 865 (2017). 
79. Compare id. at 1240–41 (acknowledging the Tanner safeguards as sufficient to deter racial bias 
in deliberations), with United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87–88 (1st Cir. 2009) (asserting the Tanner 
safeguards are not adequate with regard to ethnic and racially charged comments exerted in jury 
deliberations). 
80. Benally, 546 F.3d at 1233; see also McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915) (describing 
the balancing test as weighing “redressing the injury of the private litigant” against “inflicting the public 
injury [that] would result if jurors were permitted to testify as to what had happened in the jury room”). 
81. Benally, 546 F.3d at 1240–41. 
82. Id. at 1240. 
83. Id. 
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III.    PEÑA-RODRIGUEZ V. COLORADO: 
THE JOURNEY FROM THE TRIAL COURT TO THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
In 2007, based on his contact with two teenage sisters, Miguel Angel 
Peña-Rodriguez was charged with (1) a felony for attempted unlawful sexual 
contact, (2) two misdemeanors for harassment, and (3) a misdemeanor for 
unlawful sexual contact.84  The sisters, who reported the incident to their 
father,85 separately identified the assailant as Peña-Rodriguez.86  
Consequently, Colorado state prosecutors filed criminal charges against 
Peña-Rodriguez.87 
During voir dire, a questionnaire was presented to the prospective jurors 
to evaluate their potential bias and establish their ability to hear the case.88  
The questionnaire assessed whether the jurors had any feelings toward the 
present case that would make it difficult for them to serve as a fair and 
impartial juror.89  Additionally, the trial judge asked the panel whether any 
of the prospective jurors had any feeling for or against the prosecution of 
Peña-Rodriguez.90  Then, defense counsel plainly asked the panel whether 
“this is simply not a good case for them to be a fair juror.”91  None of the 
potential jurors gave any indication that they held bias or any other inability 
to be a fair juror in the case.92 
Following a three-day jury trial, Peña-Rodriguez was found guilty of the 
three misdemeanor charges for harassment and unlawful sexual contact with 
the sisters.93  However, the jury was hung94 on the felony charge of 
 
84. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 861 (2017); Peña-Rodriguez v. People, 
350 P.3d 287, 288 (Colo. 2015), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017). 
85. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 861. 
86. Id.; Peña-Rodriguez, 350 P.3d at 288. 
87. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 861. 
88. Peña-Rodriguez, 350 P.3d at 288; see also United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 202 
(2d Cir. 2002) (describing voir dire as “the most common and direct ground on the basis of which 
actual bias is found to exist”). 
89. See Peña-Rodriguez, 350 P.3d at 288 (“[T]he jury venire received a written questionnaire, 
which inquired, ‘Is there anything about you that you feel would make it difficult for you to be a fair 
juror in this case?’”).  But see United States v. Greer, 968 F.2d 433, 435 (5th Cir. 1992) (explaining that 
without a showing of individual-based bias, a court’s decision not to exclude the prospective juror will 
not be deemed an abuse of the court’s discretion). 
90. Peña-Rodriguez, 350 P.3d at 288. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 861 (2017). 
94. Cf. Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 125 (2009) (asserting a hung jury is not evidence 
of anything other than a failure of a jury to decide a case). 
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attempted sexual assault.95  As a result, the trial judge accepted the jury’s 
guilty verdicts for the misdemeanor charges and declared a mistrial for the 
felony charge.96  Before the jury was released, the judge provided the jurors 
with instructions regarding their right to discuss the case upon discharge.97 
After the judge dismissed the jury panel, two jurors approached 
petitioner’s counsel on their own accord.98  The two jurors provided 
information to petitioner’s counsel about a fellow juror (“H.C.”) exhibiting 
racial bias toward Peña-Rodriguez.99  According to the jurors’ affidavits, 
H.C. stated the following: (1) “I think he did it because he’s Mexican and 
Mexican men take whatever they want[;]”100 (2) “[N]ine times out of ten[,] 
Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and young 
girls[;]”101 and (3) Peña-Rodriguez’s alibi witness was not credible “because, 
among other things, he was ‘an illegal.’”102 
Consequently, Peña-Rodriguez, armed with the affidavits from the jurors, 
filed a motion for a new trial.103  The trial judge took notice of the bias but, 
nonetheless, denied Peña-Rodriguez’s motion for a new trial because 
Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) explicitly prohibits inquiry into jury 
deliberations and the comments made by jury members amongst their fellow 
jurors.104  On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals and the Colorado 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling denying Peña-Rodriguez’s 
motion for a new trial.105  Peña-Rodriguez argued that, by disallowing 
consideration of the juror’s racial statements via the no-impeachment rule, 
the Colorado Supreme Court violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by 
an impartial jury.106  Subsequently, Peña-Rodriguez filed a writ of certiorari 
 
95. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 861. 
96. See id. (reciting that the jury did not reach a verdict on the count of attempted sexual assault). 
97. Id.  Following the jurors’ discharge from service, the judge advised the jury:“[T]he court 
instructs you that whether you talk to anyone is entirely your own decision. . . .  If any person persists 
in discussing the case over your objection, or becomes critical of your service[,] . . . please report it to 
[the court].”  Id. 
98. Id. at 870. 
99. Id. at 862. 




104. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 862; Peña-Rodriguez, 350 P.3d at 289 (concluding Rule 606(b) 
“barred any inquiry into H.C.’s alleged bias during deliberations”). 
105. Peña-Rodriguez, 350 P.3d at 289, 293. 
106. Soronen, supra note 4. 
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to the United States Supreme Court.107  On April 4, 2016, certiorari was 
granted.108 
IV.    PEÑA-RODRIGUEZ V. COLORADO: 
ARRIVING AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court stated the overarching question in Peña-Rodriguez was: 
[W]hether there is an exception to the no-impeachment rule when, after the 
jury is discharged, a juror comes forward with compelling evidence that 
another juror made clear and explicit statements indicating that racial animus 
was a significant motivating factor in his or her vote to convict.109 
Ultimately, the Court answered this question in the affirmative.110  The 
holding of Peña-Rodriguez forced the Supreme Court to weigh the importance 
of an individual’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury trial 
with enforcement of the no-impeachment rule.111  The Court held that 
racial bias has no place in the judicial system and must be addressed with 
great caution.112  Further, the Court held that racial bias is of grave 
importance; therefore, a rule must be provided to avoid a loss of confidence 
in jury verdicts—a confidence that is paramount to the Sixth 
Amendment.113 
 
107. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 862–63. 
108. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1513 (2016). 
109. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 861.  But see Mark Joseph Stern, Read Anthony Kennedy’s Stirring 
Denunciation of Racially Biased Juries, SLATE (Mar. 6, 2017, 2:49 PM) http://www.slate.com/ 
blogs/the_slatest/2017/03/06/read_anthony_kennedy_s_stirring_opinion_in_pe_a_rodriguez_v_co
lorado.html [https://perma.cc/9TCB-Z6SA] (asserting the only real question before the Court is 
“whether [racial] discrimination is so egregiously unlawful that, when it is present, the Constitution 
must override the no-impeachment rule”). 
110. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 871 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Court today holds that the 
Sixth Amendment requires the States to provide a criminal defendant the opportunity to impeach a 
jury’s guilty verdict with juror testimony about a juror’s alleged racial bias, notwithstanding a state 
procedural rule forbidding such testimony.”). 
111. See id. at 868 (majority opinion) (“This case lies at the intersection of the Court’s decisions 
endorsing the no-impeachment rule and its decisions seeking to eliminate racial bias in the jury 
system.”). 
112. Id. 
113. Id. (“An effort to address . . . racial bias is not an effort to perfect the jury but to ensure 
that our legal system remains capable of coming ever closer to the promise of equal treatment . . . .”).  
“Racial bias is ‘a familiar and recurring evil’ so harmful to the administration of justice that it cannot 
be ignored.”  Supreme Court Holds that Racial Bias in Justice System Must Be Addressed, EQUAL JUSTICE 
INITIATIVE (Mar. 6, 2017) https://eji.org/news/supreme-court-holds-courts-must-address-racial-bias 
[https://perma.cc/5QRN-WVR5]; see also Brinson v. Walker, 547 F.3d 387, 393 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(branding racial bias the “prototypical form of bias”). 
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A. Justice Kennedy’s Majority Opinion114 
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy held: 
[W]here a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial 
stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment 
requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial 
court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial 
of the jury trial guarantee.115 
However, the Court reasoned that not every comment “indicating racial 
bias or hostility” will trigger the no-impeachment racial-bias exception.116  
Rather, the defendant must show that one or more jurors exhibited enough 
overt racial bias or animus toward the defendant to question the impartiality 
and fairness of the deliberations and the resulting verdict.117  Only when 
this overt racial bias is shown will the no-impeachment rule be set aside to 
allow for further inquiry into the racial comments made during jury 
deliberations.118 
With this holding, the Court did not provide a standard for determining 
when a verdict should be set aside and a new trial granted.119  Instead, the 
Court is providing a remedy for overt racial bias in jury deliberations that 
allows a court to further investigate whether a verdict shall be set aside and 
a new trial afforded.120 
B. Justice Thomas’s Dissenting Opinion121 
Justice Thomas asserted that “[t]he Sixth Amendment’s . . . right . . . is 
limited to the protections that existed at common law when the Amendment 
was ratified.”122  Thus, according to Justice Thomas, the Court must look 
to the common law to determine whether the Sixth Amendment supports a 
 
114. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 860 (“Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined.”). 
115. Id. at 869. 
116. Id.  “[T]he statement must tend to show that racial animus was a significant motivating 
factor in the juror’s vote to convict.”  Id. 
117. Id. 
118. See id. (clarifying this threshold inquiry is made at the discretion of the court considering 
all circumstances, such as the reliability of evidence and the timing and content of the statements 
alleged). 
119. Id. at 870; see also United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001) (providing 
that a showing of even one racist juror will suffice for inquiry into jury deliberations). 
120. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 870–71. 
121. Id. at 860 (“Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion.”). 
122. Id. at 871–72 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
15
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racial-bias exception.123  At common law, the right to a jury trial did not 
include the option to impeach a verdict through juror testimony of 
misconduct during deliberations.124  The common law rule—termed “Lord 
Mansfield’s no-impeachment rule”125—prohibited the use of juror 
affidavits to impeach a verdict.126  Historically, Lord Mansfield’s no-
impeachment rule was widely accepted amongst American tribunals.127  In 
furtherance of his position, Justice Thomas stated that the Constitution—
specifically, the Sixth Amendment—does not impose a uniform rule nor 
lend support for a racial-bias exception.128  Because the Constitution does 
not demand a national rule, Justice Thomas found that neither should the 
Supreme Court.129 
C. Justice Alito’s Dissenting Opinion130 
Justice Alito addressed the commonality of the American legal system, 
with different components of the system having similar rules that prohibit 
the admission of confidential information.131  According to Justice Alito, 
 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 872 (“The common-law right to a jury trial did not . . . guarantee a defendant the 
right to impeach a jury verdict with juror testimony about juror misconduct . . . .”). 
125. Vaise v. Delaval (1785) 99 Eng. Rep. 944; 1 T.R. 11; Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 873. 
126. See Vaise, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (indicating Lord Mansfield’s refusal to impeach a verdict by a 
juror’s affidavit).  Prior to 1785, juror affidavits were willingly reviewed to impeach a verdict.  
McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268 (1915); accord Jessica L. West, 12 Racist Men: Post-Verdict Evidence 
of Juror Bias, 27 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 165, 171 (2011) (“Lord Mansfield held that neither 
affidavits nor testimony could be received as evidence as to impeach a verdict.”). 
127. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 873 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The vast majority of [s]tates 
adopted the no-impeachment rule as a matter of common law.”); see also Bull v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. 
(14 Gratt.) 613, 627–28 (1857) (acknowledging Lord Mansfield’s no-impeachment rule as well-settled 
law). 
128. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 874 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
129. See id. (finding that a racial-bias exception to the no-impeachment rule is not 
constitutionally required, and thus the Supreme Court should not be required to create one). 
130. Id. at 860 (majority opinion) (“Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., 
and Thomas, J. joined.”). 
131. Id. at 874 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 108 
(2009) (defining the attorney-client privilege as “one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential 
communications” (quoting Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998))).  The Court 
further held that “assuring confidentiality . . . encourages clients to make ‘full and frank’ disclosures[.]”  
Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 108 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).  See 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 572 (2011) (asserting confidentiality between a physician and  
patient maintains the integrity of the relationship); see also 38 U.S.C.A. § 7332 (West 2017) (restricting 
a physician’s ability to disclose confidential patient information through medical records).  Similarly, 
confidentiality is essential to the relationship between a pastor and members of their church.  Christine 
P. Bartholomew, Exorcising the Clergy Privilege, 103 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1042 (2017). 
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the loss of probing evidence has long been a factor weighing against the 
release of confidential information.132  Even still, the Court has upheld the 
rules protecting such confidential information.133  The same issue—the 
release of confidential information—is present in Peña-Rodriguez v. 
Colorado.134  Allowing jurors to testify about comments made during 
deliberations would “undermine the system of trial by jury that is integral to 
our legal system.”135 
Providing great deference to the American people, Justice Alito explained 
that the jury room affords a right to citizens of different professional 
backgrounds to not be judged by their submissions in the deliberation 
process.136  This right is paramount to trust in our judicial system.  
Therefore, the jury room door must remain locked and we must guard their 
deliberations.137  With the majority’s holding, the Court is essentially prying 
this door open.138  The majority’s holding is grounded in an attempt to 
combat racial bias.  However, racial bias is not a new development in the 
judicial system, and the Court was not convinced before this case to create 
a racial-bias exception.139 
Justice Alito also addressed how the majority distinguished Peña-Rodriguez 
from Tanner and Warger.140  But Justice Alito emphasized how they are 
similar.141  The three cases are similar in that they all state the no-
impeachment rule promotes judicial interest and that an individual’s Sixth 
Amendment right is protected by the Tanner safeguards.142 
 
132. See Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 874 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The goal of avoiding 
interference with confidential communications of great value has long been thought to justify the loss 
of important evidence . . . .”). 
133. Id.  Chief Justice Roberts, in a 2007 term decision, held that “[t]he way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”  Parents Involved in 
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007). 
134. See Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 874 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating the issue of confidentiality 
is present in this case). 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 875. 
138. See id. (asserting that the Court’s inquiry into jury deliberations does little to respect the 
jury’s privacy and thus violates the jurors’ constitutional rights). 
139. See id. (“[U]ntil today, the argument that the Court now finds convincing has not been 
thought to be sufficient to overcome confidentiality rules like the one at issue here.”). 
140. Id. at 878. 
141. See id. at 879 (explaining the Court’s failure to adequately distinguish Tanner and Warger 
from the present case). 
142. Id.  The Tanner safeguards are: (1) voir dire, (2) the ability of court personnel and fellow 
jurors to report juror misconduct, and (3) probative evidence found outside of the jury panel.  Tanner 
v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 142 (1987). 
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Lastly, Justice Alito stressed the danger of opening the flood gates for 
similar equal protection claims to impeach a verdict.143  Creating a racial-
bias exception turns this case into an equal protection case, which would 
not be limited to racial bias.144  The racial-bias exception would require the 
judiciary to evaluate each statement made during jury deliberations to 
determine whether it falls within the purview of racial bias—a slippery slope 
of subjective evaluation making it difficult to “discern the dividing line 
between . . . racial or ethnic bias” and ambiguous statements.145 
V.    THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RACIAL-BIAS EXCEPTION: 
WILL THE EXCEPTION APPLY IN CIVIL CASES? 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado made an 
exception to the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury trial, which 
pertains exclusively to criminal proceedings.146  However, there is a real 
question about whether the racial-bias exception to the no-impeachment 
rule extends to civil proceedings as well.  The Seventh Amendment serves a 
similar purpose as the Sixth Amendment in that it provides the right to a 
jury trial but in civil proceedings.147  The Seventh Amendment right to a 
jury trial in civil proceedings has not yet been extended to the states like the 
Sixth Amendment has.148  Rather, the right to a jury trial in state courts is 
afforded through state statutes and constitutions.149 
In a similar holding to Peña-Rodriguez, the Court in Batson v. Kentucky150 
extended the prohibition against race-motivated peremptory jury challenges 
 
143. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 883–84 (Alito, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that treating the 
case at bar as an equal protection case would not limit the exception to racial bias). 
144. Id. at 884. 
145. Id. at 884–85 (“The Court’s decision is well-intentioned.  It seeks to remedy a flaw in the 
jury trial system, but as [the] Court said some years ago, it is questionable whether our system of trial 
by jury can endure this attempt to perfect it.” (citing Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120)). 
146. See generally Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855 (creating a racial-bias exception to the general rule 
excluding the use of juror testimony to impeach a verdict). 
147. The Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial regarding common law suits.  U.S. 
CONST. amend. VII. 
148. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 (2010) (explaining not all of the Bill 
of Rights have been applied to the states).  In addition to the Seventh Amendment: the Third, Fifth, 
and Eighth Amendments have not been fully applied to the states pursuant to the Due Process Clause.  
Id. at 765 n.13. 
149. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15 (stating the right to trial by jury is “inviolate” and allows 
the legislature to pass laws to regulate or maintain the right). 
150. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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to include civil cases as well as criminal cases.151  The Court in Batson held 
that the Equal Protection Clause—applicable to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment—would be violated if the Court allowed jurors to 
be removed on the basis of race.152  Similarly, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete 
Co.,153 the Court held that prospective jurors could not be stricken from 
the venire based on race.154  The Court in Edmonson held that the same 
analysis required to prove a prima facie case for racial discrimination in a 
criminal case applied in the civil context as well.155 
The holdings in Batson and Edmonson relied heavily on determining 
whether the individuals performing the racist acts were performing a state 
action.156  If an individual is performing a state action, then the Equal 
Protection Clause comes into play and restricts the states’ ability to make 
procedural decisions based on race.157  In other words, once the jury is 
empaneled, the jurors become state actors and their actions and comments 
can be characterized as state actions that are subject to the restrictions of 
the Equal Protection Clause. 
It is undisputed that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from 
denying an individual equal protection of the laws.158  In the context of 
Peña-Rodriguez, a juror is restricted from making racially driven comments 
during jury deliberations—regardless of whether the case is civil or 
criminal.159  Therefore, the Court’s holding in Peña-Rodriguez has the power 
to apply in both civil and criminal cases. 
 
151. Id. at 84 (affirming the principle that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a state from 
deliberately and purposefully making decisions based on race). 
152. Id. at 90, 93–94. 
153. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991). 
154. Id. at 631.  The holding in Batson, a criminal case, applies in Edmonson, a civil case.  Id. 
155. Id. 
156. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 114–15 (discussing petitioner’s contention that a peremptory 
challenge does not constitute state action); Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619 (“Racial discrimination, though 
invidious in all contexts, violates the Constitution only when it may be attributed to state action.” (citing 
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972))). 
157. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1994) (“Intentional 
discrimination . . . by state actors violates the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”); see also Johnson v. 
California, 543 U.S. 499, 543 (2005) (announcing that when a state actor uses race as grounds for a 
decision, the state actor carries the burden of showing the race-based decision is justified). 
158. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
159. Cf. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 630 (“Racial discrimination has no place in the courtroom, 
whether the proceeding is civil or criminal.”). 
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VI.    CONCLUSION 
American courts have consistently followed the principle that what 
happens in the jury room, stays in the jury room—subject to limited 
exceptions outlined in Rule 606(b).  Moreover, jury deliberations have long 
been a thing of mystery in that in only rare circumstances will a court be 
permitted to inquire into comments made while the jury was deliberating.160  
In drafting the majority opinion, it appears Justice Kennedy looked beyond 
the language of the Constitution, focusing primarily on the meaning of the 
constitutional provision—affording a defendant in criminal proceedings the 
right to an impartial jury trial.161  In contrast, Justices Thomas and Alito 
drafted their dissenting opinions with a formalistic approach by looking to 
whether common law and the text of the Sixth Amendment support a racial-
bias exception.162  With these varying approaches, it raises the question of 
whether the Court will continue to look beyond the text when it comes to 
constitutional jurisprudence.  Nevertheless, it is clear the Court’s decision in 
Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado is a large step in the direction of remedying our 
judicial system of racially charged motives.  Admittedly, racial bias has 
historically been an issue in the United States.  However, the Court’s 
decision in Peña-Rodriguez shows that courts will not be reluctant to take 
action in an effort to combat racial bias and impart trust and confidence in 
the judicial system. 
 
 
160. See generally Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017) (emphasizing the 
narrow scope of this exception); see also United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 365 (1851) (emphasizing 
the powerful role the jury plays in trial), superseded by statute, Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93–595, 
88 Stat. 1926, as recognized in Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855; McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915) 
(“The argument [in favor of admitting juror affidavits as to an overt act of juror misconduct] has not 
been sufficiently convincing to induce legislatures generally to repeal or to modify the rule.”). 
161. See Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869 (relying on the Sixth Amendment in creating an 
exception to the no-impeachment rule). 
162. See id. at 874 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating the decision to be made on the no-
impeachment rule should be left to “the political process”); Id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (asserting the Court 
has not made their decision based on any test or basis). 
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